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ABSTRACT

During the Lebanon War (1982), many Israeli reserve soldiers disobeyed the command to join their units for service in Lebanon. Several of these soldiers were publicly labeled "sarvanim" meaning "refusers" in Hebrew, and were jailed in military prisons. Kohlberg's (1976) cognitive developmental approach to moralization, which views justice as a universal concern that develops through six stages, was used to examine the moral reasoning of 36 sarvanim in relation to the structure of their moral thoughts. Subjects participated in tape-recorded interviews. Their hypothetical moral reasoning was measured using the first two dilemmas from Kohlberg's Form B of the Standard Moral Judgment Interview and actual moral reasoning was recorded by a semi-clinical open-ended interview. All protocols were scored by an independent rater who classified dilemma responses into two broad categories and assigned a stage score for each match between a manual criterion judgment and a moral judgment in the interview. The results support the hypothesis that mature moral thought would lead to mature moral action. The data suggest that the decision to disobey was structured mainly by those soldiers who could employ at least stage four reasoning. Although subjects seemed to exemplify by their actions a high degree of personal moral consistency, this consistency is only one dimension of the complexity of this moral action. Several methodological and conceptual aspects may have contributed to the findings. (NRB)

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MORALITY IN ACTION - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL JUDGEMENT AND MORAL ACTION OF ISRAELI RESERVE SOLDIERS WHO REFUSED TO SERVE IN LEBANON.

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the relationship between the form of hypothetical and actual moral reasoning of 36 Israeli reserve soldiers, aged 23-46, who refused to serve in Lebanon. It is hypothesized that mature moral thought as has been measured by Colby et al. (1983), should lead to mature moral action. The findings support this thesis ($R=0.63$, $p<0.001$). Some methodological and conceptual considerations regarding the study are being raised.

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MORALITY IN ACTION - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL JUDGEMENT AND MORAL ACTION OF ISRAELI RESERVE SOLDIERS WHO REFUSED TO SERVE IN LEBANON.

INTRODUCTION

Israel's security is maintained largely by civilians in uniform, particularly in war situations. Following their three years of compulsory service, these civilians are called once a year for active duty, from the age of 21 to the mid fifties, to perform one month of reserve service with their unit wherever it is sent. Naturally, in times of emergency, the nature, frequency and length of duties change for the worse.

The moral stand of the Israeli army has traditionally been respected by the Israeli public for the measured and just use of military weight even in desparate situations (note 1). The Lebanon War (June-Sept 1982), was the first military campaign to be undertaken without favorable national consensus (Shiff and Yaari 1984), and saw the emergence of various protest movements (note 2).

Though the necessity of the war was publicly questioned, individuals' disobedience within the army was morally condemmed (note 3). Nevertheless, in September 1983, when this study started, there were already 80 instances of reserve soldiers disobeying the command to join their units for service in Lebanon, insisting on performing their duty within the international border(note 4). They were jailed for 14-99 days in military prison (Note 5).

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Assuming that an individual's moral functioning is best understood via reasoning (Locke 1983), the following study is an attempt to explore the moral reasoning of these soldiers, leading to their disobedience, in relation to the structure of their moral thoughts, utilizing the cognitive developmental approach to moralization (Kohlberg 1976). The key assumption of this approach lies in the conception of justice as a universal concern that develops through six stages, from the the primitive mode of reasoning concerned with the action's potential consequences - through social or legal prescriptions regarding right action, toward the most elaborated mode of self chosen principles regarding human rights and universal justice (Kohlberg 1969, Lickona 1976). In this model, the gradual increase of the individual's internal moral capacity may reach the point where judgement is freed from personal and societal constraints. This thesis entails the premise that maturity of moral thoughts, as measured by the Standard Moral Judgment Interview (Colby et al.1983), should lead to mature moral action (Kohlberg 1971, Kohlberg and Candee 1983). Methodologically, the complex connection between cognition and moral conduct can be unfolded only if hypothetical and actual moral reasoning are recorded in the same type of moral situations (Damon, 1980), and can best be traced when starting from the concrete behavioral choice (Blasi 1983).

Following this line of inquiry, this study is confined to those Israeli reserve soldiers who were jailed as a result of their disobedience (in many cases the soldiers' requests not to serve in Lebanon were granted). Whereas a statistical approach requires the use of a control group, it will be argued that for the line of inquiry presented here it is not needed. Would the control group consist of those soldiers who hold the same moral con-

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viction yet decided that active service in Lebanon was the right action? Would it consist of those who hold the same conviction yet do not have the inner power to translate it into action? Would it consist of soldiers who hold the same conviction but chose to use other, legal means to evade service, or those who chose to employ personal excuses such as job difficulties, illnesses etc?

Bearing in mind that moral reasoning without a context cannot be rank ordered for morality (Brown and Herrnstein 1976, Locke 1983, 1983a), the action of disobedience to be studied here, should be distinguished from the other known categories of non-violent examples of law-breaking, such as civil disobedience or conscientious objection (Cohen 1971, Haan 1975, Zashin 1972), by the following characteristics:

1. This study is focused on the interplay of moral judgement and the choice of an unconventional action within the Israeli context: Disobedience within the army. The jailed soldiers were publicly labled as sarvanim meaning 'refusers' in Hebrew. Despite five wars prior to the most recent one, Israel knew only few sarvanim sporadically refusing to serve and receiving public condemnation (Blatt et al, 1975). The period of the Lebanon War was the first occurrence of this phenomenon in such magnitude. Yet, the hostile attitude toward this type of objection to military activity remained, and is best exemplified by the dominant response presented to the author of this study when trying to locate the sarvanim "I have no such friends ..."

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2. Though the moral reasoning of the sarvanim was recorded after the performance of their action, in a sense it can also be regarded as pre-action since all were facing a second (or third) call for reserve service in Lebanon, and were thus facing the dilemma of repeating their disobedience.

3. Compared to previous wars in this country, the morality of the Lebanon War became a subject of public debate not only with regard to its being an optional war (note 6), but also due to the unconventional way in which it was handled (Shiff and Yaari 1984). One dramatic example of this debate is found in the unprecedented request of the one of the country's outstanding colonels to participate in the fighting with his men as a simple soldier in order to persuade the army authorities to abandoned a planned action, unjust by his reasoning. His request was not granted and he was dismissed from the army. Yet, when taking part in the anti-war protest movement, this officer emphasized to the gathering that "one may oppose the war but one MAY NOT REFUSE TO SERVE in the army, because that will undermine the basis of the army's existence, which is vital in our case" (The Jerusalem Post, May 17 1983).

This study attempt to contribute to the field of moral psychology in two ways: Firstly, it investigates disobedience in an irreversible life and death context (Gilligan 1982); secondly, as it is conducted under "laboratory conditions" (a war situation), and within an institution where discipline is a fundamental prerequisite, it provides an oppourtunity to study the morality of disobedience "in the making" (Piaget 1965/1932, p.11).

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METHOD

Subjects

Originally, 39 out of 86 sarvanim were invited by the author to be interviewed, of which 3 refused. The final sample consisted of 36 subjects, aged 23-46 (mean = 31.1, mode = 28), from three main cities and five Kibbutzim. Sixteen subjects were married (of them 11 with children), 15 unmarried and 5 divorced. Eight subjects were new immigrants (of them seven from non democratic countries). Twenty three subjects had academic studies including Four Ph.D.s and three doctoral students (mean = 14.9). One subject was a Captain, four were Lieutenants, two were second lieutenants seventeen were sergants and the remainder were corporals and below. They belonged to paratroop, infantry, engineer, artillery, armoured and medical units. Twenty-six subjects served in Lebanon, either in the war or in the reserves following the initial period of the war. Thirty subjects were the only sarvanim in their unit. In the order of their sentencing for this offence, the 36 subjects were numbered between the second incarcerated and the eighty-second.

Measures and procedures

Each subject was interviewed individually in his home by the author. The interviews lasted 2-4 hours and were tape recorded by permission. The subjects' hypothetical moral reasoning was measured with the use of the first two dilemmas from Kohlberg's Form B of the Standard Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) (Colby et al. 1983). The actual moral reasoning (AMR) was re-

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corded by a semi-clinical open-ended interview, with the use of structured probing questions revolving around the right to become a <u>sarvan</u> within the IDF during a war time and the motivation for such an action. The order of the MJI and AMR interviews was changed between subjects.

Scoring

All protocols were scored by an independent rater not participating in the study. The scoring procedure for MJI followed Kohlberg's revised manual (Colby et al. 1983). AMR was scored blindly with regard to MJI scores by the same scorer. The scoring procedure involved the classifying of responses to a dilemma into two broad issue categories and then assigning a stage score for each match between a manual criterion judgment and a moral judgment in the interview (Colby et al. 1979). The scores for MJI and AMR were given in the form of a Moral Maturity Score (MMS) as well as Global Scores (GS) for each subject. The Moral Maturity Score represents a weighted average of the issue scores and ranged from 100 (pure stage 1)to 500 (pure stage 5). Stage 6 does not appear in the revised scoring manual since, in practice there is no difference between stage 5 and 6 (Gibbs et al. 1982). The Global score consists of a pure stage (the subject's modal level) or of a transitional score (e.g. 3/4) when two stages are assigned an equal number of points.

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RESULTS

Table 1. presents the subjects' MJI and AMR stage scores' distributions.

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The table shows that the subjects' MJI and AMR scores range between the transitional stage 2/3 up to stage 5. Both distiributions have means of 400 and medians that fall between 350 and 400. The modal stage for MJI and AMR is 350 and 400 respectively. Spearman correlation between MJI and AMR is 0.63, significant at p< 0.001 level. The table further suggests that a significant number of subjects (69.4%) utilize Actual Moral Reasoning (AMR) from stage 4 and above ($x=5.44$, $p<0.025$).

DISCUSSION

The data presented in the present study provide a preliminary picture of the moral thoughts and behaviour of a group of Israeli reserve soldiers who refused to join their unit in its assigned military activity in Lebanon, preferring to be sent to military prison. Whether this solution is the just one within the Israeli reality is a question to be further studied, but since there may be no just solution to many moral dilemmas (Hare 1981), it is of prime interest to learn about the guiding principles of these moral decision makers in action and their relation to the structure of their moral thoughts (Kohlberg 1976). The data suggest that the actual decision to disobey was structured mainly by those soldiers who could employ at least stage 4 reasoning, indicating their understanding of the legal prescriptions regarding the rightness of disobedience within the IDF during a war time, as the dominant prerequisite.

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The impressive significant correlation between the hypothetical and actual moral reasoning of the sarvanim points toward their unique experience of personal moral consistency (Blasi 1980). Whereas this finding may serve as a strong support for Kohlberg's premise, it seems to deserve some further explanations. In the following, assuming no scoring errors, there is an attempt to delineate some methodological and conceptual aspects that may have contributed to the present findings.

1. Methodological considerations

a. **The specific nature of the action as a political choice** - Measures of moral reasoning were found to be highly correlated with distinct political orientations (Candee 1976). Moreover, political actions which were oriented toward the REJECTION of the adequacy of the system's conventional definitions have been found to be more associated with post-conventional thinking (Elmer et al. 1983). Within the Israeli context the sarvanim's action sets an example for a strong rejection of traditional national conventions, which they themselves endorsed (and probably serves as one of the reasons for not refusing on the first day of the war):

> "My decision NOT to refuse on the first day of the war needs to be analyzed in the right context. You are drafted in the middle of the night, the atmosphere is that of blood, fire and casualties... combined with some kind of pressure, anxiety and fear...You are all alone to make the decision ... and all that you know at this moment is that the country may have been attacked by its hostile neighbouring countries and that it is your responsibility as a citizen to give what you can in such a crisis situation...and if there is a real need for a military operation you want to do a good job... and I also understand that sometimes a soldier cannot be informed of all the details in certain situations ... And there is also a fear of extreme reaction of the army if you refuse at this moment... and you want to believe that all the values of the Israeli Defence Forces(IDF) are still intact .. This was not my

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first war, but IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I BEGAN TO QUESTION ALL THE NORMS UPON WHICH I GREW UP AS AN OFFICER IN THE IDF. ... I did not have the inner strength to refuse on first day... Not because of my conscience.. I guess it was a matter of fear.."(Subject 1).

b. **The effect of real life moral judgement on hypothetical reasoning and the concrete action** - The complex relationship between judgement and action should follow three steps of empirical examination: The hypothetical moral reasoning, the real life moral reasoning, and the actual action's reasoning (Damon 1980). The MJI and AMR stage scores seem not to reflect the subjects pure hypothetical and actual moral reasoning and they are confounded to a certain extent with the subjects' real life moral reasoning regarding the dilemma of individual's disobedience within a given social system to which he is obliged:

"You ask if a person is obliged to do all that he can in order to observe the law- but the real question is: what is the person's ability? I am not sure that everyone knows his own ability.. it is something that you discover under certain circumstances.. particularly if you perform the action you decided on.." (Subject 23).

"I think that the case of Doctor Jefferson is easier than ours. Indeed, he has the power to kill... the same power that we have. However.. we may be killed very easily, regardless of our judgement in a war that we do not endorse. This is not the case with Doctor Jefferson..in his case, the law helps him to protect his life. In our case, the law oblige us to kill" (Subject 10).

c. **Moral reasoning as self justification** - The hypothetical and the actual moral reasoning of the <u>saryanim</u> were examined after their release from prison, a place where most of them were staying as a group, stimulating each other with various types of moral reasoning

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and crystalizing their moral stand toward a specific CONTENT of the action:

"You ask me if Dr. Rogers should report Dr. Jefferson. But I don't understand your question! I think that if Dr. Jefferson, decides that the right action is to give the woman the drug, HE SHOULD STAND UP AND REPORT IT BY HIMSELF PERSONALLY AND NOT WAIT TO BE REPORTED... He should explain his just motive for action though it is against the law... In the same way I see the sarvanim - if you decide that serving in in Lebanon is not justified, don't find physical excuses but stand up for what you think" (Subject 8).

The moral reasoning examined in this study might be regarded as having been developed implicitly by each sarvan who came to look at his performed behaviour asking himself: what must my attitude be if I am willing to behave in a certain fashion within a given context (Bem 1970). The following are some indications for these ideas:

"In a case such as the refusal, you first feel that you have no option but to act in a certain way. It is a very strong feeling and you cannot sit calmly unless you do it. Only then, one's moral thoughts become clear" (Subject 5).

"There was a fear of dying in vain. After all, the price that I was going to pay was much higher than the societal price should I go to prison. This is what I am saying to you now when you interview me. It is not necessarily what I thought then" (Subject 25).

"Before I refused, I came to Lebanon with the Israeli T.V. to report "sabra and Shatila"(The refugee camps near Beirut in which Christian militiamen massacared hundreds of palestinian civilians).. "We interviewed one Israeli soldier who had been nearby and when we presented the program he was no longer alive.. The film was powerful - it showed in flashbacks both the funeral of the soldier and the removal the corpses.. I decided that I would not enter Lebanon any more... afterward I saw the American T.V. movie by Hitchcock on Hiroshima and said to myself- If there are people in this world who can justify such actions, then every thing that I do is O.K... If there is one single moral justification for such an action, than I am 100% O.K. in my action of disobedience" (Subject 13).

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d. **The specific design of the sample study** - As noted by Fromm (1981), "In order to disobey, one must have the courage to be alone" (p.21). The subjects in this study sample seem to have shared this characteristic, being the function of one or more of the following sources:

1) Previous experience of successful solitary actions:

> "We were facing the Syrians and I said to myself: 'I don't know what I am doing here' and I planned that if there was a sudden attack, I would crawl out at the side of my tank and not take part in the fighting..but then I knew that if it happened I would not have the determination to do so.. the social pressure in war is sometimes irresistable...The decision to refuse was my second hard decision. The first was my divorce..they were two recent and close decisions, and they gave me the feeling that I had the inner strength to do what I feel is right... even if the rest of the world does not share my ideas." (Subject 13).

2) Lack of formal or personal attachment to the military unit-

> "As a medic I don't have a unit of my own. I am sent to different units. I was not surprised to find that there are many medics among the sarvanim. It is not by chance. At least for myself, I know that my original attitude toward military activity caused me from the beginning to ask to serve as a medic" (Subject 28).

> "Prior the war I was already an outsider in my unit. I had many verbal clashes with the other soldiers in terms of ideology and govenment policy. I knew that at least on the hypothetical level I was completely detached from the others.. but the real problem was the actual detachment- that you are refusing and going to prison. The same bus that took me to the prison continued with them to Lebanon. I felt very bad that they would feel cold and I would be warm in prison, but the dominant feeling was that I was not part of them anyhow"(Subject 14).

3) High level of "Ego Strength"(Krebs and Kohlberg 1973):

"The question of refusal is the question of the extent to which you are ready to do things with which you are in disagreement .. in order to implement the decision to disobey within the Israeli army, to justify it to people with whom you may WANT to fight alongside in the (possible) next war, which may be a just one, (for

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example, if we are attacked by a neighboring country), you need to have either a high degree of inner strength or to happen be isolated from people" (Subject 4).

It is important to recall that thirty subjects (83%) were the only soldiers in their units to refuse service in Lebanon. It might be further urgued that this refusal to STAY with your fighting friends, (at least for those who were attached to their unit), may require more of the actor's solitary power than the refusal to LEAVE your friends as reported in the case of Haan's (1975) FSM arrestees. To a certain extent, the personal moral consistency of the sravanim may be attributed to ther ability to act as individuals. In a study, using the Kohlbergian research paradigm, on Israeli striking physicians who deserted their hospital as a GROUP, a significant stage loss was found between hypothetical and actual moral reasoning (---, 1984a).

e. **The nature of the scoring system** - One important dimension of the action performed by the sarvanim was their conscious lawbreaking. In such cases, it may be expected that these actors will hold rational moral justification in support of the correctitude of the action (Cohen 1971). These prohibition-oriented reasonings, while being only one domain of moral judgement, matches Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas with their salient concerns of laws, rules, authorities and formal obligations (Eisenberg-Berg 1979). Moreover, ad hoc examination of the data, using Lyon's (1982) scoring system, suggests that 66% of this sample consisted of individuals with jus-

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tice reasoning as the predominant mode of moral thinking, while the rest were divided between care considerations(10%) and both modes (24%).

2. Conceptual considerations

a. **The focus on resistance to temptation as the common conflicting moral situation** - From the early days of Eve in the Garden of Eden, the ability to resist situational temptation has been one of the fundamental characteristics of human morality. Developmentally, "the intervention of reason between the child and his environment, causes man...to hesitate in his interaction with the millieu" (Langer 1969, p.14). To a certain extent, it can be argued that with the use of Kohlberg's model, the actor's degree of hesitation is being measured.

In his writings, Kohlberg admits that the conflicting situation of 'resistance to temptation', where the actor is asked to break normative expectations for the sake of self interest, is the most commonly studied (Kohlberg and Candee 1983). With the exception of McNamee's work(1977), the Kohlbergian inquiry of altruistic conflicts, where the actor is required to break normative expectations in order to aid the welfare of others, is limited. Thus, it is unclear whether the same logical thinking dominate one's action in both occasions, whether the "epistemological and psychological necessity" (Bem 1974, p.2, --- 1984, 1985) which often dominates real life practice, are identical in both situations and whether the

same "ego strength" (Krebs and Kohlberg 1973) is required for accomplishing both types of moral actions-is one. As for this particular study, it remains questionable whether the sarvanim would display the same degree of personal moral consistency if their care considerations would scored in this situation and/or if their morality whould have been measured within an altruistic type of conflict.

It seems that a comprehensive understandingof the individual's moral psychology should account for both types of moral considerations within the two types of conflicting situations. In its present formulation, however, Kohlberg's stage model seems to reflect the individual's degree of hesitation in interacting with the millieu while detaching himself from tempting situational components. It is not surprising, therefore, that mature moral thinkers, as measured by Kohlberg, are more likely to be found in those conflicting situations where HESITATION in performance is the action's prerequisite (see for example Milgram's task (1974)). The subjects in this study often indicated this dimension as a crucial factor in their action:

"I didn't have any special connection with my unit. The Lebanon War, was my first reserve service with this unit after my regular service..The only person I knew personally was my officer... I was really scared that he would come and talk to me... I was scared of a confrontation with him, of my ability to cope in such situations.. thank God he was absent that day... As I spent some time till the trial staying with the people who were packing to go to Lebanon, I started to know the people, and it became extremely hard to refuse..you feel some kind of commitment .. I really don't know how to explain this feeling..you feel that you are surrounded by people.. and then the commander came and tried to inspire me, and you feel that you are swept along, taken by the power of the peo-

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pie, but then I decided that I did not want to be swept along by the people and at this stage I decided to take myself away. It is so easy to go along with the whole crowd... though these people didn't want to go to Lebanon, being together gave them some unconscious excitement... and you realy need inner fortitude to resist it.."(Subject 21).

Thus, it should be remembered that the impressive correlation between the sarvanim's judgement and action has been found in a situation of 'resistance to temptation' which matches Kohlberg's ethic of justice. However, in this type of conflicting situation (let alone where a situation of 'altruistic behaviour' applied), there was no way to account for the subjects' ethic of care and responsibility, which seems to be an integral part of any moral relationship:

"The worst parts of the refusal were going to the commander, going to the unit and coping with the prison... I am realy attached to my unit- the people- the commander - and the commander persuades you not to refuse, he does not want to put you in jail... he likes you too.. and you feel that all the talk and persuasion won't help, that 'you have to take a decisive action' but you are caught in the middle, and you don't want to act.. all the time you are running away from decision.. and it is a running away.. The commander is really my friend..we went through the same shit throughout the yom kippur war..and the other campaigns.. and suddenly you find yourself on the other side.. And what happens after prison.. you come back to serve with the same people.. and you still believe that if Syria attacks us tomorrow, you should go with them to fight, to protect your country without hesitation.. how would they accept you?.."(Subject 17).

b. **Moral action as a passive fulfilment of one's principles-** Bearing in mind that Kohlberg's theory was developed in a "decade that began with the terrible social, moral and generational divisions over Vietnam, reached new political lows in Watergate's assaults on the

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constitution..." and ended with the "Americans held hostage by a fanatical Iranian Ayatolla" (Mosher 1980, p.369), it is not surprising that the inquiry into the nature of non-violent action dominated the field of moral psychology, with the heroic figures of Gandhi and Martin Luther King taking the lead as examples of highly moral actors (Kohlberg 1980). In the rare thorough investigation of a war combatant, Kohlberg cites Bernhardt as an example of a highly moral actor for not participating in the My Lai massacre. He argues that since the morality of a situation seems clear to principled subjects (Kohlberg and Candee 1983), it may result in a clear cut definition of the moral action required, which was, in that case ,exemplified by the decision NOT to act. Kohlberg views this action as the most just in this situation, claiming that it could happen only because Bernhardt was capable of setting priority on human life, seeing that life is valuable regardless of the societal categories into which an individual falls (Kohlberg and Candee 1983). But this was not the only possibility that existed in that situation. Using the same logic, it may be argued that if life is valuable regardless of social categories, why not take the life of the ONE who orders the taking of MANY innocent lives rather than merely disobeying orders and thus NOT interfering with others' wrongdoing? It may be claimed that Bernhardt's action was governed by his desire to follow his principles rather than to change the situation for what he considered to be a just solution. Such a change, for example, could have occurred had he preferred the lives of many women and children over the life of Calley. By NOT acting, Bernhardt maintained a certain kind of moral consistency within the

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boundaries of his governing principles. As he himself told Kohlberg: "When I thought of shooting people, I figured: 'well, I am going to be doing MY OWN WAR, let them do their own war'.." (Kohlberg and Candee 1979, p.45).

Although the cognitive developmental researchers are still bothered by the question: "How does Heinz compete with Khomeini as a moral educator?" (Mosher 1980, p.370), they may continue to designate as moral those actions that are the fulfilments of principles, even though the injustice extant in the situation remains.

Conceptually, the sarvanim's action may be viewed as a pure fulfilment of principles analogous to that of Bernhardt's:

"I have a responsibility as an officer- if I thought only of myself I might have acted by lowering my physical profile or something like that..But because of the responsibility it is a public act - to cause others to do the same... My first responsibility is to try and show my soldiers that we should not go to Lebanon, and that I will not take part in commmanding them and do things that are immoral in my eyes as a result of which they could be killed... MY ACTION IS THAT OF REFRAINING FROM DOING AN IMMORAL ACTION" (Subject 30).

"I think that in the refusal I succeeded in solving MY OWN PROBLEM ABOUT THE WAR. I am not sure if this way that I chose is the 100% right way, but I am sure that this is the right way FOR ME. THIS WAS NOT MY WAR...I let them do THEIR OWN WAR.." (Subject 15).

It is suggested here, that within the realm of morality, moral action will be conceptualized not only as the actualization of one's own principles of justice but also as the capacity to rise to the occasion and undertake certain missions on behalf of the lives of others. Support for this thesis can be found in comparing the

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Biblical characters of Noah and Abraham, two figures of renowned righteousness. The Bible testifies that "Noah was a righteous man. He was perfect in his generation"(Genesis 6:9). Some sages explain this praise as being a righteous man in HIS generation- as a righteous man in HIS EVIL generation. Others interpret it as an indirect criticism: he was considered righteous in his generation when compared to the corruption surrounding him. Had he lived in Abraham's time, he would have been insignificant. All agree that Noah was not as great as Abraham, who pleaded for Sodom (Genesis 18:32): "What if ten righteous should be gone there"? Noah was content to build an ark and save himself only, and did not intercede on behalf of his generation but let them perish..(Slotowitz, 1977).

For some of the sarvanim the solution to their dilemma was NOT achieved by actualizing their own principles. There were a few who showed great concern about those aspects of the dilemma that remained unresolved. Within the theoretical framework of Kohlberg, these considerations remained untouched, as they employed the ethic of care and responsibility (Gilligan 1982):

"After prison, I had the option not to return to my unit, but than I decided I should go back: I am still thinking that there are real survival problems for our country, and there might be times where the existence of Israel would be in danger and we need a strong army.. I feel that I still have a problem with this and I cannot get rid of the feeling that it is not easy to be released from this dilemma... (Subject 31).

" You ask me now at the end of the interview if there is a question regarding the sarvanim that you should have asked but didn't.. Yes, I believe that you did not touch upon all the HYPOTHETICAL situations that left us in a dilemma.. O.K. we have refused, we did not want to participate in these military operations.. and we thought that if everybody would do the same, things would be much better... However, an immediate withdrawal now would be a disaster both for the Palestinians (since they would be killed) as well as

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for the Israeli citizens in the border areas. Thus we have an unsolved dilemma.. I THINK WE CANNOT BEAR ONLY A MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE.. THERE IS ALSO A MORALITY OF RESPONSIBILITY.. For a religious preacher, such a morality is sufficient, but for a politician.. he cannot afford it.. he must ask himself what are the large scale consequences of his actions..." (Subject 24).

CONCLUSION

This paper focused on the relationship between moral judgment and action of Israeli war refusers during the Lebanon war. When measured by Kohlberg's scale, these subjects seem to exemplify by their action a high degree of personal moral consistency. This consistency, however, is only one dimension of the complexity of this moral action. Further analysis of the moral and non-moral factors involved is needed. At the present level of inquiry, let us sum up this paper by the justice criteria given by this sarvan :

"You ask what is the limit of obedience to authority? This should be done FAR BEFORE THE LIMIT of killing, particularly before approaching those without a gun.. That is to say, if you feel that the command you receive is the one involving NO DILEMMA, I suggest to you - disobey..." (Subject 8).

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Reference Notes

1. One of the famous documents on this attitude is found in Shapira's book "Siach Lochamim" (1967), meaning in English "Conversations Of Fighters". The book was published after the Six Day War and in it Kibbutz fighters emphasize the moral considerations of Israeli soldiers and officers.

2. The Sunday Times Magazine, dated 30th of October 1983, reported on the major protest movements as follows: "More than 2000 men legally obliged to serve in the army reserve have pledged themselves to refuse duty in Lebanon by signing a petition of a radical new protest group called Yesh Gvul, a Hebrew phraze which means 'There is a limit'. (almost 50% of the subjects in this study are affiliated with this group)....'Mothers against silence' hold demonstrations (and demands) to..bring the boys safely home. And then there is the 'Peace Now', biggest and the best organized ...."

3. One form of protest to be mentioned is a group of soldiers AFTER completting a tour of duty in Lebanon, demonstrating with their commanders in front of the parliament building against the stay in Lebanon while emaphasizing: "WE ARE NOT SARVANIM".

4. At the time of writing (Jan 1985) there are 143 sarvanim .

5. As the number of the sarvanim increased, the policy of the army changed, presenting the sarvan on his release from prison, with a fur-

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ther order to serve in Lebanon, which when refused, made him liable to another term of imprisonment. Two subjects in this sample, therefore spent 56 days (second refusal) and 99 days (third refusal) in prison. The Israeli Army law permit the judging officer to imprison a disobedient soldier for 14-35 days.

6. The Lebanon war was the first "optional war" declared by Israel, compared to the "no choice wars" the country knew before. One of the former high ranking officers, stated in a lecture given in Tel Aviv University (October 1984) that " a democratic country cannot afford initiating an optional war... if it counts on the motivation of its civilians as fighters " (Haaretz, Oct. 10th, 1984).

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Table 1. Subjects' MJI and AMR global stage scores' distributions (N=36).

Stage	2/3	3	3/4	4	4/5	5
MJI	3(8.3)	1(2.8)	10(27.8)	6(16.7)	8(22.2)	8(22.2)
AMR	3(8.3)	2(5.6)	6(16.7)	12(33.3)	3(8.3)	10(27.8)

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate percentage.

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